The ideology and actions of certain militant groups in the Middle East are often condemned as a perversion of Islamic precepts. In order to achieve a theologically ideal society these groups espouse Takfirism, a minority ideology which endorses violence and in particular advocates the killing of other Muslims declared to be unbelievers. These groups justify their words and deeds with direct quotations from the Qur'an and the Sunna, which are the sources of Islamic law (Shari'a), as well as by citing historical precedents such as the Khawarij movement and Ibn Taymiyya's fatawa. This article aims to analyse how these groups (and in some cases state actors) defend their actions in legal terms and how mainstream Islamic scholars respond to what they consider to be doctrinal deviations.
Introduction
Mainstream Sunni Islam considers it wrong for Muslims to engage in the practice of takfir (excommunication), a right they consider to be held solely by God. Declaring someone a kafir 1 and subsequently taking their life are acts that nevertheless have been carried out by certain Muslim groups for centuries, right from the Khawarij in the 7 th century CE through to the alZarqawi-led Iraqi insurgency and the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in modern times.
The emergence and evolution of takfir as a device with which to identify and condemn those deemed to be non-believers and the misinterpretation or misuse of the Islamic legal and enforcement tools such as hisba and fatwa are the main reasons why Islam is plagued by apostasy and blasphemy issues and with extremist groups today. This article looks at how militant groups and state actors have developed a distinctive interpretation of Islamic concepts and precedents as a means to justify purging society of those they view as heretics. It contrasts this construction to that of mainstream Muslim scholars, who deem such interpretations as distortions of Islamic principles. The article contends that when refuting the legality of humaninitiated takfir one must avoid the pitfall of labelling their authors 'non-Muslims', as this itself may be understood as a declaration of takfir. The article thus suggests tackling this complex subject from a strictly legalistic point of view.
Drawing on the Shari'a itself, Section 1 examines the concept of takfir and shows that the right to excommunicate is God's exclusively. Section 2 then gives an overview of the evolution of takfir, from the Khawarij to the modern extremist group ISIS. It shows how the notion of takfir was first developed in the 7 th century CE and has continued to evolve throughout Islamic history, and also how the roots of modern extremist groups and the ideology they employ can be traced right back to the beginnings of Islam. Section 3 provides a brief survey of the legal and enforcement devices used by militant groups to secure the death penalty, namely fatawa (advisory opinions) 2 and hisba (commanding right and forbidding wrong) . Both of these Islamic concepts have been used from the mediaeval age onwards, but today they are being deliberately misinterpreted by extremists to punish their fellow Muslims. Lastly, Section 4 argues that takfir must be denounced without succumbing to the pitfall of takfir rhetoric.
The Shari'a's Position on Takfir: God's Exclusive Right in the Hereafter
According to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Muslim societies are ruled by infidel governments and leaders under Western influence. 3 To rid Iraq and Syria of those it deems insufficiently religious and to impose its caliphate the group has relied on the notion of takfir, a concept which enables a person's religious belief (iman) to be considered impure, false or wrong and to consequently deprive that person of their Muslim status. 4 The following section offers a brief overview of how militant groups such as ISIS selectively quote from the Shari'a, which is comprised of the Qur'an and Sunna, to justify their actions. It argues that any careful reading of these sources will show that religious sinners are not (or should not be) punished as apostates in this world and that repentance for such acts is recognised by Islam to last until death, when God will make his judgement. Moreover, although the term takfir itself does not explicitly appear in the Qur'an, the position of the Qur'an is clear: human beings do not have the right to excommunicate others, and calling a Muslim 'kafir' (unbeliever) is prohibited.
The Prohibition of Declaring Takfir in the Qur'an
The Qur'an is considered to be the first and most important source of Islamic law. ISIS and other groups have selectively quoted the Qur'an in order to justify declaring takfir and handing down punishments against those they deem unbelievers, including those who profess to follow the Muslim faith. However, although Qur'anic verses are cited, their meaning and contextual background are overlooked.
2 Singular: fatwa. 3 As he stated, 'O Muslims, the apostate tyrannical rulers who rule your lands in the lands of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Mecca and Medina), Yemen, Shām (the Levant), Iraq, Egypt, North Africa, Khorasan, the Caucasus, the Indian Subcontinent, Africa, and elsewhere, are the allies of the Jews and Crusaders. Rather, they are their slaves, servants, and guard dogs, and nothing else'. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ' They cite verse 9:73, for example, which calls for Muslims to 'strive against the unbelievers and the Hypocrites' 5 and to be a 'sword'. 6 The mediaeval exegetist Ibn Kathir (d. 774AH/1373CE) argued that this verse did indeed relate to hypocrisy in the faith as well as apostasy, 7 however other scholars have specified that attacks could only be made in selfdefence. 8 Moreover, the subsequent verse recognises the right to repent, and states that only God is entitled to punish apostates. 9 According to Ibn Kathir, verse 9:74 refers either to the case of 'Abdullah bin Ubayy, who planned to kill Prophet Muhammed, or to some hypocrites who were scheming to kill him during the battle of Tabuk. 10 As noted by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, the punishment of death would require an act of treason to have been committed in addition to apostasy per se.
11 This understanding of apostasy is not shared by ISIS (i.e. it punishes people for supposed apostasy itself, whether or not this apostasy was accompanied by a crime such as treason, murder or highway robbery); however, they reference this verse as a means of supporting their calls for capital punishment for whole sections of the Muslim population in Iraq and Syria, as well as for Muslims living in the West, even though these people have not abandoned their faith. In short, such Muslims are deemed 'guilty' of not professing Islam as interpreted by ISIS.
The Qur'an unequivocally considers that apostasy amounts to a religious sin. This position can be understood from a number of verses, such as verse 4:137, which refers to 'those who have believed, then disbelieved, then believed, then disbelieved'. 12 Ibn Kathir says that this verse is characteristic of hypocrites, noting that they 'believe, then disbelieve, and this is why their hearts become sealed'. 13 However, this verse is notable as it clearly illustrates that apostates could not have been killed for their (un)belief, because had this been the case they could not have 'believed' again. It implicitly proves that the apostate was not to be punished by death, since it mentions a recurrence of apostasy. If the Qur'an had prescribed the death penalty for the first instance of apostasy, then such repetition of the 'offence' would not be possible. As former Chief Justice of Pakistan S.A. Rahman observed, 'The verse visualises repeated apostasies and reversions to the faith, without mention of any punishment for any of these defections on this earth. The act of apostasy must, therefore, be a sin and not a crime.
14 Understanding the Qur'anic position on takfir is the crux of the matter. Although the word itself is not referenced in the Qur'an, it is indirectly prohibited. For example, verse 6:108 of the Qur'an reads as follows:
Revile not ye those whom they call upon besides Allah [non-believers], lest they out of spite revile Allah in their ignorance. 18 In this verse the Qur'an prohibits the killing of any Muslim who has openly committed to Allah by reciting the shahadah ('There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah').
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Many Qur'anic verses mention unbelievers, but the Qur'an does not define apostasy; rather, the Islamic definition of apostasy is always given by human beings. 20 Yet, according to the Qur'anic verses noted above, man does not have the right to declare takfir, only God. This is because only God holds the right to decide whether one is a believer or not, and this decision would be made only in the hereafter. As such, takfir declarations made by human beings amount to a religious sin under Shari'a law.
Thus with regards to the Qur'an, one may unequivocally assert that there is no Qur'anic support for the earthly punishment of apostasy by man, unlike for sins or crimes such as theft or fornication, which are dealt with by prescribed punishments. 21 Capital punishment for turning away from Islam thus pertains to a human creative endeavour aimed at criminalising a sin which, by definition, is only accountable for in the hereafter.
1.3
The Prohibition of Declaring Takfir in the Sunna The Sunna is considered to be the second source of Shari'a and consists of a compilation of narratives, developed in the centuries after the Prophet's era and collectively known as ahadith (singular hadith), which detail what the Prophet said, did or approved. 22 After the Prophet's death it was clearly impossible to receive direct explanations as to the significance of any 15 27 and Sunan An-Nasa'i. 28 They demonstrate that he not only prohibited takfir but also considered such declarations of excommunication to be a sin.
In order to justify killing Muslims and others they deem non-believers, ISIS has cited a number of ahadith. 29 Three prominent examples refer respectively to a Jewish poet's 'blasphemy', 30 to a chieftain of the Jewish tribes of the Khaybar killed for cursing the Prophet, 31 and to a Jewish woman, whose blood, according to the Prophet, had been spilled lawfully. 32 In the first two cases, those of the poet al-Ashraf and the chieftain Abu Rafi, the individuals concerned were executed not on blasphemy grounds, but for plotting to assassinate the Prophet; al-Ashraf had encouraged the Qur'aish to fight Muhammad, 33 while Abu Rafi had gathered various tribes and clans against him. 34 The third case, that of a Jewish woman killed for insulting the Prophet, is classified as a weak source (da'if) by the notable hadith scholar Abu Dawood (d. 275 AH/889 CE) because it only has a single narrator and no mention is made of its circumstances, making it difficult to confirm its veracity or context. 35 None of these narratives furthermore are applicable to Muslims, which is how ISIS is choosing to interpret them.
Some ahadith report that the Prophet refused to persecute those of his critics who had converted to Christianity and Judaism from Islam. One such individual was a personal scribe who had been a Christian before converting to Islam but later recanted and reconverted to Christianity. After returning to his original faith he blasphemously claimed that 'Muhammad knew nothing except what I wrote for him'. 36 The Prophet however did not kill him for making such a statement, and he eventually died of natural causes. 37 Notably, killing non-Muslims is prohibited by the Prophet in both Sahih Bukhari and Jami At-Tirmidhi.
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Evolution of Takfir: From the Khawarij to ISIS
Although the Prophet Muhammad never allowed the killing of anyone on the grounds of apostasy and blasphemy per se, subsequent events led to the development of the notion of takfir and in turn to apostasy and blasphemy being treated as serious offences. These events included the revolt of the Khawarij sect in the 7 th century CE, the Mongol invasion in the 13 th century CE, the campaigns to reform Islamic society in the 18 th century CE and the rejections and criticism of Western influence and the Western legal system in particular in the 20 th century CE. These non-Shari'a based readings of takfir have caused grave tragedies throughout Islamic history, culminating today in the rise of such extremist groups as ISIS and Boko Haram, both of which kill fellow Muslims on a large scale in the name of God.
The notion of takfir appeared very early within Islamic history, first being given prominence by the al-Muhakkimah sect during the civil wars that immediately followed the Prophet's era. They came to be known as the 'Khawarij' literally meaning the dissenters. 39 Nowadays, they are widely considered to have been a seditious group and the term Khawarij has a rather negative connotation in the Muslim world. 40 During the fourth Caliph 'Ali's reign (656-661 CE) the Khawarij and Shi'a movements split from the Sunni majority. The Battle of Siffin (657 CE) had pitted Mu'awiya, the then governor of Syria, against 'Ali, with the former charging 'Ali with not bringing the third Caliph Uthman's killers to justice. However, 'Ali refused to fight his Muslim brothers and so they agreed to settle their dispute through arbitration. 41 A civil war nevertheless ensued, as 12,000 of 'Ali's supporters (who subsequently became the Khawarij) disagreed with settling the matter through human arbitration. They contended that 'Ali should have turned to divine judgement and applied the law of retaliation, as prescribed by the Qur'an. 42 Citing their slogan la hukma illa lillah ('Authority belongs to God alone'), the Khawarij called upon all Muslims to follow the Qur'an to the letter.
This was the first occurrence in Islamic history of a sect appropriating the right to declare takfir against fellow Muslims, and the rise of the Khawarij sect can thus be seen as a starting point for Islamic extremism. The Khawarij argued that anyone who did not follow the 36 See Al-Bukhari, supra note 26, vol. 4 at number. 3617, 492. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., vol. 9, at number. 6914, 87. The Prophet said, 'Whoever killed a Mu'ahid (a person who is granted the pledge of protection by the Muslims) shall not smell the fragrance of Paradise though its fragrance can be smelt at a distance of forty years (of travelling judgement of God should be punished by death, 43 and that the duty incumbent upon each Muslim to obey his ruler should be replaced with the duty to disobey if the ruler contravened God's law. 44 They quoted the Prophet to support their stance: 'There is no obedience in sin' and 'Do not obey a creature against his creator'; 45 notably however, these quotes make no mention of capital punishment. The Khawarij considered themselves to be the only true Muslims and branded everyone else as unbelievers, which in turn they saw as sufficient reason for killing them. They were convinced that in doing so they were not acting sinfully but were carrying out their duty. 46 The Khawarij were thus responsible for two innovations within Islam: the introduction of takfir and the legitimisation of the extrajudicial killing of fellow Muslims. The result was that death sentences could be carried out by members of society rather than by state officials, albeit ideally following an impartial Shari'a court hearing. Extrajudicial killing remains to this day a central issue in many instances of takfir.
Takfir was further developed by the mediaeval Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 AH/1328 CE), who strictly distinguished between man-made and divine law and called upon Muslims living under the former to undertake migration (hijrah) to lands governed by Shari'a. He classified the kuffar (unbelievers) into several groups, the first being those who belonged to religious groups such as the Christians and with whom peace agreements could be made. 47 A second group was that of the murtadd (apostates), such as the Persians and Romans as well as other Arab tribes, who had returned to their earlier infidel ways. No peace agreements could be made with these people, nor security granted to them. Ibn Taymiyya declared that if they refused to return to Islam, fighting them was obligatory. 48 The third group comprised of those who claimed to belong to Islam but did not perform their religious duties, such as salah, zakat, and hajj. 49 They were considered by Ibn Taymiyya to be the most evil, because they had rejected Islam while still claiming to belong to it. 50 He argued that they should be fought until they returned to Islam. 51 Ibn Taymiyya thus developed the notion of takfir by introducing two ideas, namely that any failure of religious obligation was an offence and that any Muslims who failed in their religious obligations were much worse than unbelievers or members of other religious groups.
Ibn Taymiyya argued that the customary law of the ruling Mongols at the time, the Yasa code developed by Genghis Khan, had strayed from divine law because it amounted to a manmade innovation. 52 Despite the Mongols claiming to be Muslims and even including aspects of the Shari'a in their code, Ibn Taymiyya declared that they were not Muslim 'because of their irreligious behaviour and their failure to enforce the Shari'a'. 53 He urged all Muslims to actively fight their Mongol rulers: 43 Way laid down by God for the followers of Islam'. 63 He contended that polytheism in his day was far more dangerous than the shirk of the Prophet's era, as 'those whom the Prophet fought were more intelligent (…) than the people of our own times'. 64 'Abd al-Wahhab thus preached that the Muslim community was guilty of unbelief and idolatry, thereby introducing a new type of takfir which rejected traditions that had emerged after the first generation of Islam. 65 Takfir evolved further in the 20 th century CE when many Muslim majority states started to introduce western models of law. Sayyid Qutb (d. 1399AH/1966CE), a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, referred to the notion of contemporary jahiliyya to denounce Muslim societies and governments who were following the Western model by resorting to manmade laws. 66 According to Qutb this had resulted in creating a hierarchy amongst men, leading to man's ruin and downfall. 67 Another modern scholar who elaborated takfir was Abul A'la Maududi (d.1979) , the founder of the political organisation Jamaat-e-Islami. Maududi condemned Muslim majority states for borrowing their constitutions, laws and principles from nonbelievers, arguing that in some supposedly independent states Islamic law had been reduced to mere personal law or to nothing at all. 68 His writing and speeches in which he referred to 'jihad' have become highly influential; it was Maududi who coined the term 'Islamic State' to describe what he saw as the form of government to which Muslims must aspire. 69 Maududi's ideas are often cited by militant leaders. For example, in a 2014 speech at Mosul's Great Mosque in which he appointed himself Caliph, ISIS leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadi referred to Maududi's notion of a pan-Islamic state. 70 ISIS has repeatedly drawn on Maududi's claims that sovereignty, in all its forms, is for God only (hakimiya). 71 His argument that full citizenship of an Islamic state was only available to Muslims has also been adopted by ISIS. This has led to them persecuting religious minorities as well as attempting to crush any Islamic theology which deviates from the ISIS model. An example of this extremist use of takfir is the ISIS campaign against the Sunni Awakening, a coalition group in Iraq. The ISIS magazine Dabiq notes that:
…. the Sahwah Coalition [Sunni Awakening] ….is actually fighting a state that rules by the Sharī'ah and enforces adherence to its laws while the Sahwah Coalition replaces the Sharī'ah of Allah -which this state has established in its areas of authority -with the laws of men. 72 Moreover, some extremist groups today are misinterpreting Qur'anic verses in their calls to Muslims to fight against unbelievers, just as the Khawarij sect misinterpreted the Qur'an many centuries ago. For example, verse 4:140, which reads, '….when you hear the Verses of Allah being denied and mocked at, then sit not with them' is quoted by ISIS to support their claim that those doing nothing to counter the activities of kuffar (unbelievers) should be considered kuffar themselves. 73 However, according to Ibn Abbas, this verse is preventatively aimed at discouraging anyone planning to attack Muslim society rather than defining who is and is not a kafir. 74 Mention must also be made here of Sh'ia Islam, which sets itself apart from Sunnism particularly with respect to the doctrine of imamah. Shi'ites have a duty to obey their imam as well as God. This divine character of the imam has had an impact on the use of takfir in Shi'a Islam, as anyone who doubts the imam's divinity is deemed an unbeliever by his followers. However, although Shi'ites recognise takfir, they do not exclude from the realm of religion those individuals who have been declared to be unbelievers. 75 Their declarations thus differ considerably from those issued by the Khawarij and ISIS.
The Misuse of Takfiri Fatawa and Hisba as a Means to Impose the Death Sentence
Militant Islamic groups have resorted to wilful misinterpretation of legal and enforcement tools such as hisba and fatwa in order to make declarations of kufr (unbelief) and implement takfir sentences. However, the Shari'a clearly prohibits takfir and these Islamic concepts were never intended to be used in this way. This section looks at how the original objective of these legal devices has been reinterpreted in order to encompass takfir.
Fatawa
A fatwa is an advisory opinion which may be countered or replaced by another fatwa. 76 The root of the term 'fatwa' is 'fata', which refers to 'youth, newness, clarification, explanation'. 77 The use of fatwa can be traced back to Islam 79 It issued a similar takfiri fatwa against the Baha'i sect in 1977. 80 Islamic scholars have also issued takfir fatawa, with the fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie in 1989 by the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini being a particularly notable example. 81 Fatawa have often proven to be the trigger for extrajudicial killings, as with the murder of the secular Egyptian writer Farag Foda in 1992. He was declared a kafir and his assassination called for in a fatwa proclaimed by the majority of Al-Azhar's sheikhs. 82 Extremist groups and other non-state actors also issue takfir fatawa, many of which have led to extrajudicial killings. Although the fatwa against and subsequent assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (d. 1981) is a particularly well-known example there are many others featuring less celebrated figures, such as the declaration made by the powerful Pakistani organisation Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, which declared Salman Taseer, governor of the province of Punjab, apostate due to his comments and criticisms. 83 A common characteristic of contemporary fatawa is that they are given more legal weight than the Qur'an intended them to have. According to the Qur'an, a fatwa is a legally non-binding answer given by a scholar to a very specific question. 84 Similarly, notable scholars believe that fatawa do not have legal power or status. Imam Malik (Malik ibn Anas; d. 179 AH/ 795 CE) reportedly stated that, 'It was not a part of people's fatwas to say "This is halal [permissible] and this is haram [forbidden]", but they used to say, "I disapprove of this and would not do it myself," and people used to be content with that'. 85 Fatawa were not intended to be vehicles for takfir declarations; rather, they were the product of mufti question-and-answer activities. 86 They were opinions, not declarations, and were not designed to allow human interference with an individual's belief and personal relationship with God. As such many scholars have prohibited takfir fatwa, for example the mediaeval Islamic scholar Ibn Hazm (d. 456AH/ 1064CE), who argued that Muslims should not declare any fatwa relating to faith. 87 The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayeb, criticised the use of takfiri fatawa in December 2014, saying that they undermine Islam rather than defend its values. He has encouraged those deceived by sheikhs issuing such fatawa to renounce takfir. 
Hisba 3.2.1 The Traditional Objective of Hisba
The concept of hisba has been derived from the Qur'anic verse 3:104, which instructs Muslims to command good and forbid evil (al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar) and is considered as 'a cardinal Qur'anic principle which lies at the root of many Islamic laws and institutions'. 89 According to Al-Ghazali what exactly amounts to good (ma'ruf) or evil (munkar) is to be determined with reference to Shari'a, 'in particular to those rules that pertain to the protection of the five values, namely, life, faith, intellect, property and lineage.' 90 The Malikī jurist, al-Qarafī set out the following three conditions which must be obsereved in the implemntation of hisbah and are considered the basic guidelines governing the activity of the muhtasib (the person who bids good or forbids evil). These are: (i) The muhtasib must act from a position of knowledge, since an ingnorant individual who is not sure of his grounds may neither enjoin good nor forbid evil. (ii) The muhtasib must be reasonably sure that their attempts at prevention do not give rise to a greater evil. (iii) The muhtasib must act on the basis of an overwhelming probability (al-zann al-ghalīb) that the attempt to enjoin good or forbid evil is likely to achieve the direct result.
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Element (ii) above restricts the implementation of hisba to situations where the evil conduct and crimes are being committed so that 'the muhtasib is in a position to prevent it, or to bring about a change to an on-going situation'. 92 If one of either of the first two conditions is absent, according to al-Qarafī, this would render hisba illegetimate. On the other hand, the absence of the last condition downgrades hisbah from an obligation (wājib) into a mere permissibility (mubāh).
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A further debate that has preocupied the early Muslim jurists ('ullama) was whether hisbah is a collective duty (fard kafā'ī), or an individual obligation (fard 'ayn), which should be performed by every Muslim. According to Ibn Kathir, verse 3:104 asserts that although hisbah is incumbant on each member of the Ummah 94 to the extent of one's ability, this task should be fulfilled by a specific segment of the Ummah. 95 It has been argued that hisbah becomes an individual obligation and the personal responsibility of the individual concerned only in one situation 'when there is only one person in the entire community, or when a single individual witnesses evil being committed'. 96 In all other situations/capacities, it remains a collective duty of the community as a whole. A wājib is an obligation or duty arising from the decisive injunctions of the Qur'an and Sunnah. 94 Ummah designates the Muslim community or society in its entirety. 95 Ibn Kathir, supra note 7, Vol., 2 at 233 96 Kamali, supra note 89 at 29.
The dual characterisation of hisbah as both rights and duties are recognised in the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) under Article 4, 'The Right to Justice'. 97 Paragragph (c) of the above provision explicitly defines Hisbah as 'the right and duty of every person to defend the rights of any other person and the community in general'. As noted by Kamali, 'whether collective or individual, hisbah has been generally charactarised as an obligation'. 98 According to the following Hadīth, believers are encouraged to carry out hisbah in accordance with their ability and to the extent that circumstances permitted in at least three ways: 'Whoever among you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand (by taking action); if he cannot, then with his tongue (by speaking out); and if he cannot, then with his heart (by hating it and feeling it is wrong), and that is the weakest of faith'. 99 The use of the word 'sees' in the above cited Hadīth and not the use of words such as 'knows' or 'hears' as noted by Kamali, concerns the external nature of the evil being committed, and the ability of the person witnessing it to change it in some way. 100 It is clear that the hadith commands physical action, and it is not this part of literal interpretation by groups such as ISIS which is problematic. What is problematic, is the broad interpretation of what is considered 'evil' combined with jihadists' interpretation 'which turns use of the hand into a strict ideology of hisbah applied to all spheres of life, especially public piety'. 101 If evil were interpreted as for example an attack on an innocent person, then preventing that physically would pose no problem. However, when 'evil' is interpreted as any deviation from moral rules, even when affecting only the person itself, it goes beyond the idea of God's judgement in such matters. For example, physical punishment of someone for not wearing the 'right' length of trousers is clearly interpreting 'evil' too broadly. As noted by one commentator, 'jihadist have rejected latitude in favour of their own interpretation which turns use of the hand into a strict ideology of hisbah applied to all spheres of life, especially public piety'. 102 As noted by Michael Cook in his study Forbiding Wrong in Islam, Muslim scholars advocated that putting things right (taghyir) with the hand is the prerogative of political authorities, with the tongue of scholars and in (or with) the heart for the common people. 103 'This elitist interpretation' according to Cook and Meijer 'confirms the state's monopoly of force and the "natural" hierarchical structure of society'. 104 As a function of the state, hisba was instituted from early Abbasid time, whereby the Caliph or sultan would appoint a muhtasib, i.e. the chief of municipal administration and policing with three main functions: policing of markets; monitoring the state of the roads and buildings in the city; and enforcement of public morals. 105 The muhtasib stood between the qadi and the police 106 and generally had to be 'a faqih [someone with an understanding of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence)], aware of the rules of Islamic law so as to know what to order and what to forbid'. 107 They were able to force debtors to honour their debts and to take other actions that did not require formal hearings or verdicts. 108 It is thus fair to say that by making hisba an official religious post, the Abbasside Caliph transformed the concept into a political tool to get rid of any potential enemies and to portray himself as a defender of the faith. 109 The crime of apostasy was invented at the same time and worked together with hisba to eliminate any oponents of the state.
3.2.2.The Current Use of Hisba
There is no possibility that the above mentioned Qur'anic verses on hisba are intended as encouragement for pursuing allegations of apostasy or to enable declarations of takfir since as we have described at length above, neither apostasy nor unbelief are to be considered crimes in the first place nor are they for other Muslims to declare. Furthermore enforcing hisba should not involve greater mischief than the one that is to be prevented. 110 There can be little doubt that widespread accusations, persecutions, pillaging and killing based on peoples' beliefs or purported lack thereof brings unparalleled harm to a society as well as the religion itself. The Qur'an clearly states in verse 2:256 that there is no compulsion in religion, therefore forcing it on people through violent intimidation goes directly against this. However, there are numerous examples of hisba being used by states, extremist groups and courts to impose takfir sentences such as the one declared by the Supreme Shari'a Court of Sudan against al-Amin Da'ud Mohammed Taha. The point of interest here is that the litigants used hisba as the grounds for their legal action against Taha, calling successfully on the court to declare Taha's ridda (apostasy).
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A similar example of a court's use of hisba was a 1995 Egyptian case involving Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, an Arabic literature lecturer at Cairo University. Abu Zayd's promotion was blocked by Dr. 'Abd al-Sabur Shahin, a member of the review committee, who issued a declaration of takfir stating that Zaid's work offended Islam. 112 Dr. Shahin's counsel argued that on the basis of the concept of hisba they could file a lawsuit against Zayd. 113 The court deemed that society had a 'direct interest in filling a hisba suit'. 114 Hisba was considered a significant obligation by the Egyptian terrorist group al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Jama'a) and an effective tool to 'change reality'. 115 The Jama'a took the interpretation of what is 'changing the forbidden/reprehensible' (taghyir al-munkar) from the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya. 116 In extreme cases, according to Ibn Taymiyya it was the right of every subject to exert hisba and to use force without the sanction of the state'. 117 The Jama'a was also influenced by the work of the classical scholar al Nawawai who asserted that hisba is not merely confined to the Islamic authority (al-sulta al-muslima) but also those who are legally responsible (mukallaf) have the right to exert hisba. 118 When the Jama'a linked hisba with the necessity to compeletely submit to God's sovereignty (the concept of tawhid al-rubibyya) it become an activist programme of changing evil by force.
119 Their adherence to the concept of hakimiyya 'which made it imperative to rise up in revolt against the ruler who does not rule in accordance with the revelation' was the main imperative to declare Sadat an unbeliever and subsequently assassinate him. 120 The combination of hisbah and takfir is explicitly stated in their Charter which entitled Who Are We and What Do We Want?. There we read: 'No doubt that he who prefers man-made positive laws to the laws of God is a kafir …' adding that 'as it is not allowed for a kafir to rule over Muslims (la wilaya li-kafir 'ala muslim) it is a duty to depose the rulers of our country'. 121 Likewise, ISIS considers declarations of takfir to fall within its list of duties. It has its own Islamic police force (Diwan al-Hisbah) 122 to ensure compliance with hisba's requirements, which include investigating reports of drug or alcohol use and seizing such forbidden items as musical instruments or polytheistic idols. 123 ISIS has also made extensive use of hisba against those they deem to be apostates. They hold that although faith amounts to an act of obedience, it is in and of itself insufficient and must be followed by action. 124 As with the 7 th century Khawarij sect, ISIS believes that unbelievers' blood and property can be taken away with impunity. 125 Such missuse of hibah by ISIS was condemned by a wide assortment of scholars from the Middle East in a recent letter addressed to al-Baghdadi. 126 In their letter and under the section titled Coersion and Compulsion they asserted that:
It is known that the verse: 'There is no compulsion in religion' was revealed after the Conquest of Mecca, hence, no one can claim that it was abrogated. You have coerced people to convert to Islam just as you have coerced Muslims to accept your views. You also coerce everyone living under your control in every matter, great or small, even in matters which are between the individual and God. In Al_Raqqa, Deir el-Zor and other areas under your control, armed groups who call themselves "al-hisbah" make their rounds, taking people to task as though they were assigned by God to execute His commandments. Yet, not a single one of the Companions did this. This is not enjoining Unbelief is a legal designation (hukm shar'i), like slavery and freedom, its implication being the licitness of shedding blood of one (so designated) and passing a judgement upon him to the effect that he will dwell in the Hellfire forever. And since this is a legal designation, it can only be known on the basis of either an explicit text from scripture (nass) or an analogy (qiyas) drawn from an explicit text. 135 As a legal designation, the basis on which unbelief is established must therefore be: (a) an explicit text from scripture or an analogy drawn from an explicit text and (b) absolutely certain. With respect to the second criteria, in cases of preponderant probability or of uncertain sources, one 'should refrain from branding a person an Unbeliever. Indeed, rushing to brand people Unbelievers is the habit of those whose natures have been overrun by ignorance'. 136 Regarding the person accused of takfir, they must not be Muslim, i.e. they must not have recited the profession of faith. Indeed, according to a hadith reported by Ibn Umar, the Prophet said 'Withhold (your tongues) from those who say "There is no god but Allah" -do not call them kafir. Whoever calls a reciter of "There is no god but Allah" as a kafir, is nearer to being a kafir himself'. 137 Thus calling someone who has recited the profession of Islamic faith (shahada) a kafir is not permitted and results in the author of the accusation becoming himself an unbeliever, thereby engaging in successive takfir accusations. This is further substantiated by a hadith narrated by al-Bukhari and Muslim according to which the Prophet is reported to have said, 'If a man says to his brother, O Kafir (disbeliever)! Then surely one of them is such (i.e., a kafir)'. 138 Similarly, Imam Habīb Ahmad Mashhūr al-Haddād stated that it was not permissible for anyone to 'declare people to be outside Islam' if they did 'great confusion would ensure, and very few Muslims would be left on the face of the earth'. 139 As previously noted, the right to declare takfir is held solely by God and as such any takfir declared by man amounts to a violation of God's right. In view of the aforementioned, there is only a single instance in which takfir may be unequivocally applicable: when a Muslim clearly rejects belief in the oneness of God and Muhammad's prophethood, thereby renouncing his faith. This must be an intrinsic and voluntary individual undertaking -the renunciation of the shahada under duress, such as is the case in Syrian and Iraqi ISIS controlled areas does not fall under the takfir category. Likewise, a 'nominal' Muslim may not be accused of takfir as he has not voluntarily renounced his shahada. Thus when ISIS imposes strict rules regarding clothing and appearance -such as the length of clothes and beards, the prohibition of brands or noisy heels for women and so on, the non compliance to such rules does not amount to sufficient evidence of takfir.
With regards to the sentence, it has been evoked that only God may decide upon a penalty regarding takfir. One may say that takfir thus falls under the category of ibâdât or religious practice, which lies solely in the direct connection between each Muslim and God. There may be no human interference whatsoever with regards to issues pertaining to ibâdât and the same is true of takfir.
In short, cases of temporal accusations of takfir have no substance, legal implications nor meaning, except that they bear the risk for their author of being sanctioned by God themselves in the Hereafter for violating his rights.
Though it has not always been al-Azhar's stance, this point has been assimilated by its current Sheikh, Ahmed el-Tayyeb, who has condemned declarations of takfir, viewing them as 'blind sedition and a catastrophe for Islam'. 142 He himself has refrained from making declarations of takfir regarding any members of ISIS, saying that he cannot do so unless such members themselves renounce their shahada.
143 Thus a Muslim's sins, no matter how grave, are not what will cause him to leave Islam: only the chosen renouncement of the shahada bears with it the risk of being condemned by God in the Hereafter.
Conclusion
The evolution of the concept of takfir from the 7 th to the 21 st century CE has resulted in conflict and civil war in some Muslim majority states. It has become not only a mechanism for branding other Muslims, governments and societies as unbelievers, but also a trigger for Muslim intrafaith war. Contemporary takfiri groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram criticise Muslims they deem unworthy of Islam, whether they be in the West or in the Middle East. However, as seen in Part I, the act of declaring takfir is actually prohibited by the Qur'an and the Sunna which unequivocally state that only God has the right to decide, in the hereafter, one's Muslim or nonbeliever status. Therefore, if a Muslim appropriates God's right to declare takfir, they themselves may be considered by God to be sinful. There is a risk that by seeking to denounce the use of takfir by extremist groups such as ISIS, one constructs one's argument and makes judgements employing the same belief/unbelief dichotomy that one is trying to condemn. In order to avoid an unending cycle of the appropriation of God's right to judge what does and does not constitute belief, it is important to limit oneself to a simple refutation of takfir based solely on juristic reasoning. In that they amount to a usurpation of God's right, critics would be well-advised to condemn takfir as being illegal under Shari'a but not to attack those declaring it to be non-Muslims themselves; this would merely be a replication of the mistaken language of those extremist groups who kill other Muslims in the name of God.
The rise of different trends of political Islam since 1970s and the lack of political platform and visions during the Arab Spring have paved the way for the issuance of infedilising (takfiri) fatwas by Islamist movements. According to a recent report entitled 'The influence of politics on infedilizing fatwas', issued by the fatwa monitoring observatory at Dar Al-Iftaa in Egypt, these fatwas are:
[D]irected to achieve certain political partisan gains and use religion to polarize its followers, exploit the religious fervor of the people, weaken their adversaries by issuing infedilizing fatwas targeting their opponents, the cultured, and police and army personnel whom they consider tyrants…. Furthermore, infedelizing fatwas are seen as legal permits for killing and blood-shed which undermine the objectives of Islamic law.
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The Advisor to the Grand Mufti and the Supervisor of the above report stressed that such takfiri fatwas have 'lead thouthands of youths towards extremism and murder, seeking alleged martyrdom'. 145 Aware of the dramatic consequences of these fatwas and its devastating results in tearing socities apart the new Tunisian Constitution of 26 January 2014 included a clause that prohibits takfiri fatwas and the new Tunisian anti-terror law included a provision that provided for a ban on the charge of takfir with a sentence that amounts to death. It states:
Anyone accusing others of apostasy (Takfir), or inciting others to do it, or promoting the spread of hatred between religious minorities or religions, can be punished with sentences that can include the death penalty. The conviction will be heavier according to whether they bring physical violence.
The present study demonstrates that takfiri practices do not merely calssify people or excommunicate them from particular society but it also allows for their killing. Perhaps time has come for all Muslim majority states to stand firmly against the spread of political takfirism and to include in their legislations and penal codes a clear condemnation against such practice. To enact such legislation is not merely a recommendation but an imperative under the right to life provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the corresponding duty of States to protect the lives of their citizens.
